lest these claims generate "a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's 'federal right to "copy and to use,"' expired copyrights." 2 The facts of that controversy, in which the claimant appeared to be invoking time-unlimited trademark protection to end-run the exhausted (unrenewed) copyright term in a motion picture, justified the apprehension that unbridled trademark rights might stomp, Godzilla-like, over more docile copyright prerogatives. Unfortunately, in the Court's eagerness to forestall
Darwinian disaster in intellectual property regimes, it may have engaged in some unnatural selection of its own, mangling trademark policies in the process of conserving copyright. This essay will first consider how the (mis)application of copyright precepts has distorted trademarks law, then will take up happier examples of beneficent copyright influence. The first inquiry charts the near-demise of moral rights at the hands of copyright-(mis)informed trademark analysis. The second lauds the growing acceptance of copyright-inspired free speech limitations on trademark protection, exemplified by the various "Barbie" cases, 3 and culminating in the "fair use" exemptions of the Trademark been applauded, and trademark law's remedies against "false designations of origin" 4 could have continued to afford a limited means for the public to be informed about the authorship of creative works. Instead, however, the Court went much farther, holding that § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act did not address the intellectual origin of a work of authorship, but rather only the source or manufacture of physical copies of the work.
The court grounded much of its analysis in a perceived need to maintain separate domains for copyright and for trademarks, but it did not confine this discussion to copyright-expired works. Most perniciously, the Dastar Court indicated that the addition to the Copyright Act of a very circumscribed authorship attribution right in the Visual Artists Rights Act 5 promotes a negative inference that VARA is the only federal law locus for attribution rights: if the trademark law afforded attribution rights, VARA would be superfluous, and "[a] statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of course to be avoided." 6 But section 43(a) does not make VARA superfluous. There may be narrow areas of overlap, but VARA, in its severely constricted zone, affords a significant right that section 43(a) did not: an affirmative right to claim authorship, not merely a right to object to misrepresentations of authorship that confuse consumers as to the work's origin. VARA's beneficiaries are artists, but the beneficiaries of section 43(a) are the consuming public. Moreover, the rationales for copyright and trademarks laws are different. The former seeks to advance knowledge by stimulating creativity, the latter to aid purchasing decisions through truthful attribution of the source of goods or services. Arguably, removing the author's or the actor's name and replacing it with another's constitutes a false or misleading representation of fact (who is the author of this book; who performed in this film) that misrepresents the nature, characteristics, or qualities (authorship; performance) of the goods (the work). Note that, for purposes of section 43(a)(1) (B) , the Court appears to have acknowledged that "goods" can mean a "communicative work," while, for purposes of section 43(a)(1)(A), "goods" would mean only the physical copies. Query whether it makes sense for "goods" to mean two different things in these adjacent sections. In any event, the potential availability of a section The Court hypothesized that if a producer of a video that substantially copied Fox's Crusade television series were, in advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression that the video was "quite different from that series," then Fox might have a claim for false advertising for misrepresenting the nature, characteristics or qualities of the creative content of the product in violation of § 43(a)(1) (B) . That is, in this hypothetical, the defendant would be making a false statement about the content of its communicative product.
Id. (footnote omitted).
McCarthy also notes that the false advertising prong contains a restriction that the "trademark prong" does not: the misrepresentation must be "in commercial advertising or promotion." Id. at 27-149 to 27-150 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is "not an insignificant limitation. (B) ."
The Antidote court's critique, however, overlooks the consumer protection focus of § 43(a). Section 43(a), unlike § 32 of the Lanham Act, does not require that the claimant be a trademark registrant. This is because § 43(a) targets a wider range of deceitful marketplace activity, including misleading imitation of unregistered trade dress, and false advertising. The objective is not primarily to create new rights for unregistered merchants, but to protect the public. 18 This in turn suggests that the application of § 43(a)(1)(B) to misrepresentations regarding the "nature," et cetera, of "communicative goods" should be limited to misrepresentations material to the consumer. 19 As suggested 18 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS. § 27:14, at 27-25 to 27-27. The courts have nearly unanimously held that § 43(a) provides a federal vehicle for assertion of infringement of even unregistered marks and names. As the Second Circuit remarked, § 43(a) "is the only provision in the Lanham Act that protects an unregistered mark" and "Its purpose is to prevent consumer confusion regarding a product's source . . . . above, knowing who is the actual creator generally is material to the purchasing decision.
This observation may also be key to resolving the potential tension in the post-Dastar treatment of copyrighted and public domain works.
Dastar and progeny's equation of conduct permissible under the copyright law with activities permissible under trademark law gives rise to additional consumer-unfriendly anomalies. Consider this instance of copyright-permissible material deception: copyright does not protect the ideas, information, or processes that a work discloses. As a result, copyright protection for a work such as a cookbook is typically "thin," covering the chef's literary flourishes, but not the culinary preparations themselves. As a matter of copyright law, therefore, I am free to publish my own cookbook appropriating the ingredients and following the steps needed to produce Nigella Lawson's latest creations.
Moreover, because U.S. copyright law says nothing about how I label the unprotected material that I copy, any express or implied fair use obligation to credit one's sources would not extend to mere copying of public domain elements. Nonetheless, copyright's free pass on copying should not also mean that no law will prohibit me from representing that the gastronomy I describe is of my own devising. Section 43(a)(1) (B) , with its focus on consumer protection, should supply that prohibition.
But, even if authorship is or can be a "characteristic" of the work, the section expect that there would be no market for an unpromoted work, so that in most instances the requisite "commercial advertising or promotion" will occur. But the promotion might not always go to the alleged false representation. For example, if a miscredited actor did not perform in a featured role, his (or his false substitute's) name might not appear on posters and advertisements for the film. In those instances, it is not clear that the spurned performer will have a claim. On the other hand, it may also be questionable whether the misrepresentation of a tertiary actor's name is material to consumer choice. By contrast, scholarly publications afford one area in which mislabeling may matter to the consumer, but the "commercial advertising or promotion" criterion may not be met. If the senior coauthor takes sole credit for the scholarly article, the junior participants may have no legal redress, either as a matter of the Lanham Act, or as a matter of copyright law, because coauthors cannot infringe their own joint copyright.
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The sparse caselaw on the copyright management information provision included in the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 22 offers another disturbing illustration of the unfortunate emanations of Dastar. In this instance, we are seeing a 21 Though, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, they do have a duty to account to each other for the profits of their unilateral exploitation. See, e.g., Thomson v Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1998) ("Joint authorship entitles the co-authors to equal undivided interests in the whole workCin other words, each joint author has the right to use or to license the work as he or she wishes, subject only to the obligation to account to the other joint owner for any profits that are made."). If one co-author creates a new work without the other, the former co-author is not entitled to exploit the work in which he did not participate. Moreover, copying that work without crediting its author is unlikely to be considered fair use, even if the copying was done in an academic setting. See Weissmann v. Freeman 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989). 22 17 USC §1202, defines copyright management information to include any of the following information conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a work, including in digital form, except that such term does not include any personally identifying information about a user of a work or of a copy, phonorecord, performance, or display of a work:
(1) The title and other information identifying the work, including the information set forth on a notice of copyright.
(2) The name of, and other identifying information about, the author of a work.
The name of, and other identifying information about, the copyright owner of the work, including the information set forth in a notice of copyright. . . . Fortunately, the mangling of federal trademarks law, related false advertising law, and even para-copyright law by over-vigilant overseers of the copyright genome seems principally to concern authors' (tenuously extant) moral rights of attribution (and, perhaps, integrity). perceive a joke. 29 They even suggested that the first amendment might require a more persuasive showing of likely confusion when expressive works were alleged to infringe.
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These decisions did not always expressly cite the copyright fair use defense, but the considerations underlying the copyright doctrine seemed to inform trademark analysis as well. 31 The spillover effect may indeed have been inevitable, as several of the cases in which the fair use defense prevailed coupled copyright and trademark claims; it is not surprising that the sardonic expressions that proved fair use for the copyright goose would lead to similar treatment for the trademarks gander, particularly when the avian species at issue was a bird called Barbie. trademark for a lemon-lime soda, the registrant cannot prohibit a competitor from informing the public that its lemon-lime soda, FIZZUP, includes lemon zests, or that it has a zesty taste. But § 33(b)(4) does not explicitly exempt a competitor's use of ZEST to describe the competitor's product, for example, to proclaim that FIZZUP tastes better than, has more bubbles than, or fewer calories than, ZEST. Nor does § 33(b)(4) explicitly allow a non competitor, such as the (fictitious) magazine Teen Taste to elicit its readers' beverage preferences by asking them whether ZEST is their most or least favorite soda pop. Judge Kozinski dubbed these latter denominations "nominative fair use," and the sobriquet has stuck.
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The nominative fair use defense to trademark infringement proceeds through an analysis of factors. "First, the plaintiff's product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the plaintiff's product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder." 34 As we will see, these factors complement and echo the first, third, and fourth copyright fair use factors.
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Although copyright is a property "right in gross," and trademark is not (or is not supposed to be), the trademark and copyright fair use limitations have this in common:
the users of the mark or of another author's work are engaged in independent economic 33 Trademark "fair use" may have received its greatest impetus from decisions involving overlapping claims of copyright and trademark infringement, for it is not surprising that once a court has found the use to be "transformative" and to promote speech and/or learning, and thus to be "fair" in the copyright sense, that court is unlikely to find the same activity to violate the copyright holder's trademark in the copied work.
Nonetheless, the first of the "Barbie" cases to find trademark fair use did not involve copyright infringement, though it did concern a parody. 40 In that case, the song "Barbie Girl" by the Danish one-hit (at least in the US) group "Aqua" in 1997 foisted on the 36 In narrow circumstances of "market failure," redistributive uses may be ruled "fair," but the kinds of uses at issue in the copyright/trademark overlap cases are more traditionally "transformative," such as parodies. 37 Fair use of another's trademark to describe the trademark owner's goods, as lawfully repackged and resold by the defendant (the situation, for example, in Prestonettes), does not, admittedly, involve the same kind of independent economic activity. Permitting the use of the mark, however, is a necessary corollary to the "exhaustion" or "first sale" doctrine, which permits third parties to resell trademarked (or copyrighted) goods once they have been lawfully sold. world. Dress me up, make it tight, I'm your dolly." To which the bass in the group would interject in a froggish croak (Aqua's album was, after all, called "Aquarium"):
"C'mon Barbie, let's go party!"
Holding that "the trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its sourceidentifying function," 41 the Ninth Circuit rejected both the likelihood of confusion and the dilution claims. Following Second Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit balanced the "public interest in free expression" against the "public interest in avoiding consumer confusion," and accorded the former decisive weight unless the song title's appropriation of Barbie "has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work." 42 Observing that the Barbie doll was the target of the song, the court held the group was entitled to identify the butt of its joke, and had done nothing to mislead the public into thinking that Mattel authorized the song. The court dismissed the dilution claim on the ground that the 1996 Federal Trademark Dilution Act's exception for "noncommercial uses" should be construed to include parodies. Barbie and everything Mattel's doll has come to signify. Undoubtedly, one could make similar statements through other means about society, gender roles, sexuality, and perhaps even social class. But Barbie, and all the associations she has acquired through Mattel's impressive marketing success, conveys these messages in a particular way that is ripe for social comment." 44 On the third factor (amount and substantiality of the taking), the court stressed that parodies need not restrict themselves "to take the absolute minimum amount of the copyrighted work possible," and thus that, in context, reproducing the entire doll did not undermine the fair use defense. 45 On the fourth factor (harm to potential market for the work), the court found it unlikely that Mattel would enter the market for "adult-oriented artistic photographs of Barbie."
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The Ninth Circuit approvingly cited another Barbie copyright parody decision, Bavarian bondage dress and helmet in rubber with PVC-mask and waspie." Having held defendant's use to be "fair" as a matter of copyright law, notably because of the expressive values the parody advanced, the Ninth Circuit effectively sealed the fate of the trademark and dilution claims. When Mattel offered a survey to rebut the copyright fair use argument that the Food Chain series was parodic, the court rebuffed it, ruling that a work's parodic character is objectively determined, that public perception is irrelevant. 50 Curiously, the court did not address the survey in its trademark analysis, even though public perception normally is highly relevant to the assessment of likelihood of confusion. Rather, with respect to Food Chain's incorporation of Barbie in the title of the series, the court relied on its prior decision in the Barbie Girl song case to reject a likelihood of confusion claim. With respect to Food Chain's alleged violation of Mattel's trade dress rights by reproducing the Barbie figure (largely undressed), the court ruled the copying nominative fair use. "Forsythe used 48 Id. at 322. 49 Id. 50 353 F.3d at 801 ("The issue of whether a work is a parody is a question of law, not a matter of public majority opinion.").
Mattel's Barbie figure and head in his works to conjure up associations of Mattel, while at the same time to identify his own work, which is a criticism and parody of Barbie. Where use of the trade dress or mark is grounded in the defendant's desire to refer to the plaintiff's product as a point of reference for defendant's own work, a use is nominative." 51 "Conjure up," notably, is a standard formulation of the minimum extent of copying that the copyright fair use caselaw permits in a parody. 52 Not surprisingly, then, the court's analysis of the second nominative fair use factor -whether defendant used only so much of a trademark or trade dress as is reasonably necessary --echoed its treatment of the third copyright fair use factor. 53 By the same token, having found as a matter of copyright law that the defendant was not usurping a potential market -"adult"
photos --that Mattel was likely to enter, the court ruled on the third nominative fair use factor that "it is highly unlikely that any reasonable consumer would have believed that
Mattel sponsored or was affiliated with [defendant's] work. 54 Finally, on the dilution claim, the court again relied on "Barbie Girl" to hold "Food Chain" noncommercial within the meaning of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, and thus not actionable. 55 Congress has recently endorsed the judicially-devised nominative fair use limitation, and the resulting exclusion of parodies from the ambit of the dilution claim. In the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 56 Congress reaffirmed its expansion of
